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Contracting for supplies and services within a contingency and deployed 
operational environment has become a vital necessity. Despite the last decade and a half 
of armed conflict, the military services as a whole have done a poor job of teaching their 
leaders how to effectively plan for and manage operational contract support, starting with 
requirements generation and continuing to post-award contract management. The 
objective of this research is to develop a case study for use in Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) schools that examines the far-reaching strategic, operational, and 
tactical effects of operational contract support (OCS).   
This case study will examine the use of OCS in a deployed environment, and the 
positive and negative impacts of OCS decisions on the tactical, operational, and larger 
strategic military mission. We also consider the long-term effects of the requirement and 
subsequent contract action—fiscally, politically, and locally. The case study is meant to 
spur discussion on how second-, third-, and fourth-order OCS effects impact the United 
States’ military mission and general interests.   
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Contractors have been utilized in warfare for hundreds of years. The United States 
in particular has used them in every theater of every conflict since the Revolutionary War 
to provide a range of services including field mess support, logistics support, and 
security. Regardless of the role contracted support has played in the conflict, contractors 
have assisted the United States in achieving its desired end-state. Like any entity in an 
ever-changing battlespace, contracted support brings with it problems and challenges. As 
with any military operation, planning and preparation is the best way to mitigate those 
challenges. The planning processes for contracted support have evolved independently 
across each military service, and while some concepts remain consistent, gaps have arisen 
in how each military service plans for contracted support during contingencies. Operation 
Iraqi Freedom highlighted these gaps in planning and some of the subsequent effects 
included loss of lives, funds, and, in some cases, mission failure. On 29 December 2011, 
the Code of Federal Regulations 32 Part 158 was signed into law and mandated that the 
Department of Defense (DOD) conduct operational contract support (OCS) in order to 
rectify the issues that arose from stove-piped military service planning. The governing 
document that coalesces the individual military services’ planning documents is Joint 
Publication (JP) 4-10, Operational Contract Support. Through education, the government 
will be able to ensure that OCS will be implemented throughout the DOD. This research 
seeks to provide a simple, yet common case study to senior-level service members in 
order introduce the effects of OCS within a deployed environment. 
A. WHAT IS OCS? 
OCS “is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and 
construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations” (Office of the Joint 
Chief of Staff, 2014, p. ix). The need for a joint doctrine to govern the proper conduct of 
OCS has its roots in the increasing number of joint theater conflicts that the United States 
military conducts. While the United States has reaped the benefits of operating jointly in 
support of the Global War on Terror, the complex nature, personality, and culture of each 
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military service has led to gaps in planning for contracted support. The top-down, 
bottom-up approach of OCS is meant to be utilized across the joint environment from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense down to the Geographic Combatant  
Commands (GCC). OCS is broken down into three main elements: Contract Support 
Integration, Contracting Support, and Contractor Management (Office of the Joint Chief 
of Staff, 2014). The desired end-state is not only a contract that gives the customer their 
supplies or services on time, within scope, and within the established budget, but, most 
importantly, meets customer requirements in a way that enhances (or at least does not 
hinder) the overall strategic mission. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
United States Code of Federal Regulations § 158 states that all DOD military 
services shall apply OCS by planning, integrating, and synchronizing contracted support 
consistent with combatant commanders (CCDR) policies and JP 4-10. Therefore, it is 
imperative that all DOD military services understand the concepts of OCS and how it 
actively affects commanders at all levels of conflict—tactical, operational, and strategic. 
Analyzing an individual case that is unique, but not uncommon in its challenges allows 
readers to more fully understand how OCS can affect the outcome of contracted support 
and, importantly, the outcomes contracted support has on the larger mission. This 
research seeks to identify and highlight common problems that may arise throughout the 
planning and contracting process. We have produced an OCS case study with a 
discussion guide that a facilitator can use to incorporate the case study into their 
curriculum. 
C. INCORPORATING OCS INTO JPME 
United States Code of Federal Regulations § 158.5(c)(8) tasks the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support) (DASD(PS)), under authority, 
direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Material Readiness, with “serving as the DOD lead for the oversight of training and 
education of non-acquisition, non-contracting personnel identified to support OCS 
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efforts” (United States Congress, 2011, p. 754). The Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Material Readiness decided that the training and education of personnel 
within the DOD military services should be accomplished by including OCS in the 
existing Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) curriculum.  
It is important to note that while everyone can benefit from understanding the 
proper use of OCS, the main target audience for understanding OCS is commanders at all 
levels of operations. Contracted support enables the commander’s mission—his or her 
understanding of the use of OCS to positively affect operations is paramount. In order to 
apply the concepts of OCS, commanders must understand how and why OCS is 
conducted at the joint level of operations. They must also understand the potential 
benefits of well-executed contract support, as well as the ramifications of poorly executed 
contract support. The most effective way to efficiently convey the main concepts of OCS, 
and its effects is through a carefully written case study that uses an actual contract event 
in an operational environment. The case study will help senior leaders who are familiar 
with the challenges of a dynamic battlespace to understand how OCS can drastically 
affect the outcome of an operation at tactical, strategic, and operational levels.  
D. CONCLUSION 
 OCS is simply a tool that the DOD will utilize to manage contractors. In essence, 
it has been used already by contracting personnel for as long as the DOD has utilized 
contractors. Incorporating that tool within JPME will introduce the concept to senior 
leaders. Once those senior leaders return to the operating forces, they will utilize the 
basics of OCS to plan, execute, and monitor operations utilizing contracted support. In 
order to understand how to utilize OCS, it is important to understand what OCS is. The 
next chapter will provide that information and how to incorporate it into the operations 
order. 
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is intended to give the reader a brief overview of the OCS 
process, the orders that direct it, and insight into how the military services are currently 
implementing OCS. The first publication this review will look at is Joint Pub 4-10 
Operational Contract Support, this publication explains in detail how the Joint Force 
Commander should plan and incorporate OCS. The second publication is Joint Pub 5-10 
Joint Operational Planning Process. Joint Pub 5-10 explains the planning process used 
across the Joint Operational Forces and breaks these plans down into the phasing model. 
Similar to this publication the next review is on the Marine Corps Planning process, 
which is very similar to the Joint process. This review will also give the JPME student a 
general idea of where each of the four service components currently stand with the OCS 
development and where the GAO has identified improvement areas. By understanding 
the background and guidance within this chapter, a JPME student will have a greater 
appreciation for the scope and importance of OCS. 
A. JOINT PUBLICATION 4-10 
JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, was written in response to Title 10, 
United States Code, Section 2333, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 
3020.41, OCS. These documents direct the GCC commander “to plan for the proper 
organization, integration, and synchronization of OCS actions in all combatant 
commander directed military operations” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, Joint 
Publication 4-10, 2014, pp. I-1). The systems approach to the planning process finds its 
origins within JP 5-0, Joint Operations. By employing the structures listed in JP 4-10, 
GCC and subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFC) are able to plan and coordinate the 
three functions of OCS: Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support, and 
Contractor Management (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). 
OCS is a multidisciplinary team effort composed not only of contracting 
personnel, but logisticians, planners, subject-matter experts, and command leadership. No 
single organization is responsible for all of the functions of OCS within a command, 
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especially in a joint operation. OCS functions are coordinated through designated 
bureaus, boards, centers, cells, and working groups (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 
2014). There should be a permanent OCS Integration Cell at each GCC to conduct initial 
phase 0 functions. There should also be a designated lead contracting activity supporting 
each GCC that is responsible for coordinating contracting activities within each GCC’s 
corresponding geographic area. 
A GCC and its subordinate commanders must prioritize their contracting 
requirements when planning an operation. The prioritization of requirements assists the 
OCS process in fully supporting the commander’s intent for the mission while heeding 
the financial and resource constraints inherent in all missions. Taking the time to plan and 
prioritize requirements before a crisis erupts allows the commander time to consider the 
potential second- and third-order effects that may result from contracted support 
decisions. When performed correctly, early planning also allows the commander time to 
consider how he or she will use the powerful economic capability that OCS provides to 
advance his or her strategic warfighting mission. Through close coordination with 
contracting personnel, a commander will understand how contracting can assist them in 
conducting their mission and exploiting their contracting and financial resources as 
mission-enhancing weapons.  
The following discussion will break down into detail the three main tenets of OCS 
and explain to the JPME student what all is involved within each tenet. This 
understanding will be crucial for the rest of the document. The first tenet is Contract 
Support Integration, the second is Contracting Support, and the third tenet is Contractor 
Management.   
1. Contract Support Integration 
Contract Support Integration is composed of the actions the command can take to 
ensure that subordinate and supporting contracting offices “are prepared and organized to 
plan and manage OCS actions” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10: 
Operational Contract Support, 2014, pp. III-1). Again, OCS is a team effort that involves 
all of the staff sections within the command hierarchy. In order to accomplish this 
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mission, OCS is broken into various types of OCS planning and coordination boards, 
cells and working groups depending on the size, scope, and complexity of support 
requirements. The three main entities that perform the functions of OCS within the joint 
environment are the Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board, the 
OCS Integration Cell, and the OCS Working Group. Each of these entities serves to 
further the advancement of OCS principles across the joint command’s AOR. These 
boards are not to be confused with the requirements review board, which reviews, 
validates, prioritizes, and approves contract support requests at the operational level 
(Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014).   
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) directs the “OCS planning for all 
plan levels and type, to include commander’s estimate, base plan, concept plan, 
operations plan, and campaign plan” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2104, p. III-8). 
The JSCP also directs that an Annex W (Operational Contract Support) be drafted when 
planning for an operation. The increasing role that contractors play within the DOD 
highlights the growing importance of the Annex W and the incorporation of OCS into the 
planning phase (see Appendix A). JP 4-10 provides the following five outcomes of a 
properly conducted CSI: (1) contracted support can be a “force multiplier capability when 
organic support is not feasible” (2014, III-9). (2) contracted support reduces military 
support personnel deployments and the associated strain of a heavy deployment schedule, 
(3) synchronized procurement, funding, and mission timelines ensure contracted support 
is applied effectively and efficiently, (4) synchronized commander’s intent, contract 
outcomes, and the operational mission, resulting in positive civil-military support 
partnerships, and (5) staff planning of contracted support increases their experience, 
which has a compounding effect on the success of other contracted support (Office of the 
Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). 
CSI provides a force flexibility that in turn increases a support force’s 
capabilities. The ability to develop contracted support allows military planners to enhance 
combat power at the point of friction and ease the burden of troops in the rear area 
operations zone (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). Thus, contracted support 
should not be considered as a last resort, but as a functional, planned part of the force. 
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Use of contracted support is especially critical when force caps are introduced for 
political or diplomatic reasons. Lastly, through the CSI process, risk is mitigated by 
incorporating the presence of contracted personnel into the operations order. The OCS-
related documents that assist in the development of the operations order are the Contract 
Statement of Requirement, Contracted Support Synchronization Matrix, and Annex W 
(Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014).   
2. Contracting Support 
In large Multi-Service operations, the GCC has the option to designate a Lead 
Service for Contracting (LSC), a Lead Service for Contracting Coordination (LSCC), or a 
Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) to provide the most efficient 
contracting support to the geographic command (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). 
This higher level of contracting coordination will prevent duplicative contracting efforts 
between designated contracting agencies and make better use of the local vendors. For 
example, instead of each military service writing its own contract for something that all 
Services operating in the area will require, such as trash collection, an LSC might write 
one large contract to provide trash collection for all units operating in the area, thus 
reducing duplicative efforts and saving contracting manpower. Using that same scenario 
and aiming toward a different effect, an LSC or LSCC might ensure that different 
contracts for trash collection services are spread among several different vendors, thus 
bolstering the financial health of more than one company and increasing local 
employment. Coordinated effort leverages the US’ buying power and synchronizes the 
effects of OCS in the AOR. This is especially important during phase 0 operations. 
During phase 0, the LSCC is designated by the GCC in order to coordinate, plan, and 
divide work amongst the geographical regions in the AOR (Office of the Joint Chief of 
Staff, 2014). The LSC, by comparison, is responsible for coordinating the integration of a 
joint force’s power across the individual components, whether part of the DOD or not. 
Finally, the JTSCC is responsible for arranging and ensuring the accurate command and 
control structure is in place during the conduct of operations. Which structure the GCC 
chooses is dependent on the larger logistics mission and other operational factors and 
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“should be planned and specifically addressed in Annex W by phase of operation when 
possible” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. IV-1). 
LSC/LSCC:  JP 4-10 gives two distinct options for arranging contract support 
using a lead service arrangement. Though the two structures are similar “the LSCC only 
has coordination authority, while the LSC is also responsible for providing designated 
(by Annex W or FRAGORD) common theater support contracting within an operational 
area, in addition to leading the Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB)” (Office of the 
Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. IV-2). Prime examples of common theater support include 
base operating support (billeting, food service, laundry etc.), transportation, facilities 
construction, linguist support services, physical security, and intelligence support 
services. If the GCC establishes an LSC, “then the appropriate Service component 
contracting activity would provide specified common contracting support to the entire 
Joint Operations Area (JOA) and would have contracting authority over attached Service 
component command contracting augmentation personnel” (Office of the Joint Chief of 
Staff, 2014, pp. IV-2). 
JP 4-10 advises that the LSCC “is most appropriate for military engagement, 
security cooperation, and deterrence activities/phase 0 operations as well as smaller scale, 
short notice, and short duration contingency operations” (JP 4-10, 2014, IV-2). The 
distinguishing feature of the LSCC is that “[t]he Services retain [command and control] 
and contracting authority over their deployed theater support contracting organizations” 
(Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. IV-2), which is considered a main advantage 
of the LSCC structure over other arrangements because it does not involve changes to (1) 
theater support contracting C2 or Head of Contracting Agency authorities (HCA), (2) 
established Service component relationships, (3) standard contracting procedures, or (4) 
“financial support arrangements between contracting organizations and their supported 
units” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. IV-2). JP 4-10 further states that the 
LSCC arrangement is also most appropriate in operations where the units from each 
military service operate in separate parts of the JOA and competition for vendors is not a 
major issue. Some coordination is still needed to ensure there are no duplicative or 
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conflicting contract actions (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). Coordination also 
helps to standardize contractor tracking and management in the JOA. 
When the GCC chooses the LSC option, it is usually the military service with the 
most capable theater support contracting that is designated. For an LSC, “[t]he designated 
Service component contracting activity is responsible to provide theater support 
contracting for specified common commodities and services for a particular geographical 
region” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. IV-3). JP 4-10 recommends an LSC 
for small, but lengthy operations that are chiefly being executed by one military service. 
JP 4-10 presents this as the middle ground of the three options available to the GCC. It 
has the advantage of providing efficient contracting support by using lead Service 
contracting resources to support all Services while eliminating redundant contracting 
actions. 
JTSCC: The third option, the JTSCC structure, is explained by JP 4-10 as best 
applied to large, lengthy and intricate phase IV and V operations. In these operations, 
“the subordinate JFC requires more direct control of common contracting actions” 
(Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. IV-4), than what can be accomplished 
through LSCC or LSC arrangements.  
JP 4-10 goes on to explain that the “JTSCC is JTF with C2, normally tactical 
control, and contracting authority over contracting personnel assigned and/or 
organizations attached within a designated operational area, normally a JOA” (Office of 
the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. IV-3). Since contracting authority is not organic to 
combatant command Service components, the JP-4-10 reminds readers that contracting 
authority understandings should be agreed upon early in the planning process. Planning 
for these arrangements should begin at the earliest stage because while the JTSCC option 
has advantages, it comes with myriad extra requirements that need to be addressed to run 
efficiently. JP 4-10 lists additional requirements, including:  
(1) implementing new organizations, C2 relationships, and contracting 
procedures; (2) more lead time to get JMD approval and fill; and (3) each 
[Military] [S]ervice must issue HCA designation orders. Moreover, the 
transition of existing contracts will be complicated and could cause 
confusion with the vendors/contractors, closeout issues, as well as the 
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compilation of historical data/lessons learned. (Office of the Joint Chief of 
Staff, 2014, pp. IV-4). 
Per JP 4-10, “the JTSCC normally reports directly to a subordinate joint force 
command and is responsible to execute all theater support contracting actions as well as 
coordinate common contracting matters with designated contracting organizations 
executing or delivering contracted support within the JOA” (Office of the Chief of Staff, 
2014, pp. IV-4). The better control that the JTSCC option offers allows for more efficient 
use of professional contracting staff and increases the JFC’s ability to enforce a baseline 
standard of support. It also “increases the JFC’s ability to link contract support to the 
civil-military aspects of the OPLAN” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. IV-4). 
a. In-Theater Contracting Planning and Coordination 
Contracting planning is a functional task performed by all contracting agencies. 
Executed in response to stated requirements, contracting planning’s precise definition is 
set out in the FAR, DFARS, and other contracting authority guidance (Office of the Joint 
Chief of Staff, 2014). In OCS, contracting planning means that supporting contracting 
commands are responsible for the work that ensures contracts meet procurement 
requirements in the most effective, economical, and timely manner. Additionally, 
contracting planning includes ensuring contracts are closed out in a timely manner 
considering personnel resources and workload (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). 
Failure to closeout contracts within the required timeframe (usually within 180 
days of acceptance of the final invoice) is a DOD-wide problem that also affects garrison 
contracting offices (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). By closing out contracts in a 
timely manner, the government is able to ensure that contractors are being paid properly 
and on time. It also ensures that the government is receiving goods and or services for the 
funds they expend. This is especially important in a deployed environment where 
contractors have much to lose when the government does not uphold the terms of the 
contractual agreement. Finally, closeout is the best time to identify if improper payments 
have been made to a vendor—the government’s ability to rectify improper payments and 
get their money back decreases as time passes. 
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b. In-Theater Contracting Coordination. 
The JFC generally uses a JCSB to “coordinate and de-conflict contracting actions 
within a designated operational area” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. IV-7). 
JP 4-10 recommends that, “The GCC or subordinate JFC should direct the formation of a 
JCSB in any operation where there will be significant possibility of redundancy and 
competition between different military service’s or combat support agency (CSA) 
contract actions and coordination would serve to improve the overall economy and 
efficiency of these contracting actions being delivered or executed in the JOA” (Office of 
the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. IV-V). LSCC, LSC, or JTSCC convenes the board and 
determines the meeting schedule necessary to accomplish its JFC-directed mission. 
Membership on this board should include appropriate military service civil augmentation 
programs and CSA representatives as well as a J-3/J-4 advisor (Office of the Joint Chief 
of Staff, 2014). 
3. Contractor Management 
Contractor management, as defined by JP 4-10, “involves the control, support, 
and integration of contractor personnel and their associated equipment deploying and 
operating in the operational area” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. xiv). To 
proactively manage contracted support, contractor personnel must be thought of and 
planned for as an official part of the deployed force from the beginning. Many contractor 
management issues can be prevented or mitigated with proper integration planning 
(Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). 
JP 4-10 takes care to emphasize that, “unlike military members and DOD 
civilians, contractor personnel are managed and controlled through contract management 
and governmental oversight staff in accordance with the terms and conditions of their 
contract” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. V-1). Thus, commanders’ have 
almost no authority to assign contractor personnel to perform a task that falls outside the 
scope their contract, except in a few emergency situations if certain conditions apply. 
Contractor management, as explained in JP 4-10 “is a shared responsibility 
between the JFC staff, requiring activities, supported unit, base commander, and 
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supporting contracting officer” (Office of the Chief of Staff, 2014, pp. I-V). Ensuring the 
careful military oversight of contractor personnel is vital, and contractor pre-deployment 
training, personnel accountability, and equipment reporting must be proactively planned. 
Each section (both primary and special staff) on the JFC staff handles all contractor 
management related matters specific to their functional responsibilities. For instance, the 
staff sections must maintain the responsibility to manage the daily lives of the contractors 
who reside aboard the installation (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). This includes 
everything from sanitary services to management of the electric grid. The J-4 manages all 
of the logistics that allow the contractors to eat, sleep, and maneuver within the AOR, and 
the J-1 is responsible for tracking their movements while they reside in the AOR. 
JP 4-10 instructs the GCC and subordinate JFCs to “establish clear, enforceable, 
and well understood theater entrance, accountability, force protection, and general 
contractor personnel management policies and procedures early in the planning stages for 
a military operation” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. V-3). It further exhorts 
the GCC and his subordinate JFCs to coordinate carefully with the various subordinate 
military service components and CSAs in order to ensure an oversight plan is established 
before operations begin. These management plans must be made with the understanding 
that the terms and conditions of any contract set the boundaries in the relationship 
between the military and the contractor. Thus, military personnel cannot directly 
supervise contractor employees. Supervision of contractor employees is a job reserved 
entirely for the contractor’s management personnel (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 
2014). To exercise any management control over a contractor, military leaders must work 
through contract management team. That team normally consists of the contracting 
officer, COR, and the on-site contract company manager. Any plans for contractor 
management must be made accordingly. 
A combatant command level contractor management plan (CMP) provides 
AOR or operational area specific contractor personnel and equipment-
related guidance to ensure contractors authorized to accompany the force 
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(CAAF)1 supporting an operation are qualified to deploy, processed for 
deployment and redeployment, received in theater, and visible and 
managed in theater, per GCC guidance and as required under the terms 
and conditions of the contract. (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, 
pp. V-6).  
While Annex W focuses on plans to procure and integrate contracted support in 
general, the CMP, a key part of OCS planning, is specifically focused on how to provide 
support (e.g., deployment, base camp services, force protection [FP]) to contractor 
personnel within the framework of their contracts’ terms and conditions. During OCS 
planning, the shaping of the CMP should also focus on “risk assessments and mitigation 
regarding the impact of contractors in support of military operations” (Office of the Joint 
Chief of Staff, 2014, p. V-5). CMPs will cover all of the following activities: 
a. Pre-deployment Preparation  
Pre-deployment preparation is needed to ensure CAAF meet all GCC 
requirements before entering the operational theater (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 
2014). The supported CCDR coordinates with JFC and military service commanders to 
settle on and publish theater entrance requirements for all CAAF. “Theater entrance 
requirements include operational-specific administrative preparation, medical 
preparation, as well as general training, and equipping guidance. For services contracts 
supporting foreign contingencies, the contracting officer will use standard DFARS 
deployment clauses to ensure that the contractors understand and are ready to execute 
their contract in a contingency environment” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. 
V-8). 
b. Deployment and Reception/Redeployment 
Deployment and reception, “which includes CAAF reception, staging, onward 
movement, and integration (RSOI) and has its own unique set of challenges” (Office of 
                                                 
1  CAAF personnel are U.S. citizens or Third Country Nationals (TCN) who do not normally reside 
within the operational area, Local nationals (LN) who are considered mission essential, such as linguists 
may also be granted CAAF status. Non-CAAF personnel generally include LN and TCN non-mission 
essential employees who are permanent residents or guest workers in the operational area.  
 
 15 
the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. V-12). All CAAF deployment and follow-on movements 
should be carefully tracked using tools such as Synchronized Pre-Deployment and 
Operational Tracker and the Joint Asset Movement Management System. These systems 
track the location of contractors in theater which enables the JFC to control the flow of 
CAAF into and out of the operational area all the way through their deployment process. 
Redeployment actions should be conducted in the reverse order of deployment actions. 
Redeployment actions should end with a return to their original point of embarkation 
through their designated deployment center. At the return center redeployed contractor 
personnel will turn in all government-provided organizational clothing and individual 
equipment and government-issued ID cards, and finish any other mandated out 
processing actions (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). 
c. In-Theater Management   
In-theater contractor management tasks include, but are not limited to: legal 
authority and discipline, sexual assault prevention, reporting law of war violations, 
contractor visibility and accountability, movement control, government furnished support 
(GFS), and FP/security. Staff planners should refer to DODI 3020.41, Operational 
Contract Support, for guidance when planning to integrate contractor personnel into 
contingency operations. 
JP 4-10 mentions more than once that “contractor personnel are not part of the 
direct chain of command” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. V-14). It goes on to 
explain that despite that fact, commanders do have important legal authority over certain 
contractor personnel. However, JP 4-10 is also careful to note (in bold type) that many of 
these legal and disciplinary authorities “apply to foreign contingencies and have 
restrictions based on particular SOFA/security agreements, the type of contractor 
employees, the nationality of the employees, the type of operation, and nature of the 
criminal offense” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014, p. V-14). 
Per DOD policy, contract companies provide all the support their employees 
require to accomplish their tasks, unless the terms and conditions of the contract state 
otherwise. However, in contingency operations, planners have found that it is generally 
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more efficient for the government to collectively provide life support to all CAAF (Office 
of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2014). Each military service manages its GFS decisions, and 
all GFS support to contractor personnel must be approved by the GFS adjudication 
authority before contracts are approved. Key GFS-related tasks include: base camp 
services, personnel recovery, medical support and evacuation, postal services, mortuary 
affairs, post/base exchange privileges and access to the MWR Center. Pre-approval is 
required to ensure capacity exists (or can be obtained) to provide services to contractor 
personnel. 
B. JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0, PLANNING PROCESS 
A phase can be characterized by the “focus” that is placed on it. 
— Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2011 
The Joint Planning Process uses a six-phase model as a guide for potential joint 
operations. Each phase is unique and all phases must be coordinated in support of one 
another. Phases may slightly overlap, but each phase should have unique starting and 
ending criteria. When one phase ends, the next one in the sequence should begin. The 
commander’s guidance and intent should develop the conditions needed to move into a 
new phase or execute the current phase. Phases should be conditions-driven rather than 
time-driven. Using a phasing model to synchronize the concept of operations, the 
commander can control all of his forces in a more fluid manner and avoid unnecessary 
pauses during the operation. 
Successful phasing in an operation prevents the force from reaching a culminating 
point too early. The process must take into account appropriate operational pauses that 
allow the logistics and force-sustaining operations to help replenish and reconstitute the 
main force. Commanders must appropriately plan for these pauses, and do so in a way 
that does not allow the enemy time to reconstitute his force. The phasing model also 
gives the commander the flexibility needed to allow the phases to be adapted or even 
omitted if necessary in order to exploit opportunities against the adversary. It is even 
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flexible enough to allow some areas of the operation to operate within different phases if 
needed. 
This method of planning is effective for various operations that cover the full 
spectrum of military operations. The six-phase template is not set in stone, but merely 
serves as a guide for the commander to plan and shape his model to match the operation. 
It is up to the commander to pick the appropriate phases needed for each campaign and to 
ensure that the phases are executed appropriately. Further, OCS is applicable to all 
phases, however the role of OCS and the ability to obtain battlefield effects varies by 
phase.  
a. Phase 0 – Shaping 
Phase 0 is the shaping phase. During phase 0, joint forces and their allies may 
conduct routine military operations designed to deter potential adversaries and project 
power in a peaceful manner. These exercises are held continuously to reinforce 
relationships with allies and are focused on addressing “defined national strategic and 
strategic military objectives” (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2011, p. III-42). Shaping 
operations are essential for developing and sustaining partner nations’ military 
capabilities and the further development of friendly cooperation between militaries. The 
shaping phase is also essential for base access and for intelligence sharing. Phase 0 
shaping activities must be relevant to each particular theater and should be part of normal 
day-to-day security operations. OCS activities that should take place during Phase 0 
involve the establishment of contract related review boards, working groups, and a 
thorough review of the operational environment in order to assess the security 
cooperation required.   
b. Phase 1 – Deter 
Also known as the Deter Phase, this phase is focused on discouraging an 
adversary from taking any negative action by showing him the capabilities and 
determination of the joint force. Phase 1 sets the stage for deployment and potential 
employment of a joint force in the event that the potential adversary is not deterred from 
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taking action. If a crisis has been identified, the deter phase may include moving forces to 
staging areas, executing pre-deployment functions, increased partnership with allies, 
shows of strength, and any other action needed to prepare for a possible crisis (Office of 
the Joint Chief of Staff, 2011). These actions continue to build upon the security activities 
that were conducted and prepared during Phase 0. OCS actions should continue to 
support deterrence activities, which might range from special operations missions to 
establishing a staging base for follow-on phases. 
c. Phase 2 – Seize the Initiative 
Seizing the Initiative, Phase 2, is where joint commanders employ the joint force 
capabilities appropriate to the crisis at hand. If the crisis is a combat operation that means 
going on the offensive as quickly as possible. By seizing the initiative, the joint force 
drives the adversary to culminate offensive action early, and allows the conditions for the 
next phase to take place. Quick and violent application of joint combat forces may be 
required to deny the adversary from achieving its early goals. If the enemy has achieved 
his initial goals, forcing them off those objectives and using overwhelming combat power 
creates the conditions necessary to pursue and destroy the adversary during the next 
phase. The JFC will continue to conduct operations in order to eliminate the adversary at 
the earliest opportunity and to put an end to the crisis (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 
2011). The Joint Commander should always ensure that stability operations are available 
and ready to be applied in order to help solve the problems that led to the crisis in the first 
place. The majority on contracting support during this phase will be conducted by the 
established peacetime contracting commands. Due to the fluid nature of the battlefield, 
there will be limited system support provided by organic contracting forces during  
Phase 2.  
d. Phase 3 – Dominate 
The Dominate Phase is centered on breaking the enemy’s resolve for continued 
resistance (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2011). If the crisis is a non-combat scenario, 
the Dominate Phase is defined by having complete control of the operational 
environment. The Dominate Phase is accomplished by having and employing 
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overwhelming force and capability at the right time and place. Phase 3 involves every 
major joint force asset and involves the appropriate application of those forces in the 
operational area as fast as possible. Actions should force teams will be in theatre and 
working in direct support of the units, they are attached. Once the operational 
environment is under control, the conditions may allow for a favorable conclusion of the 
adversary to reach his culminating point and allow the joint force to achieve its primary 
objectives. The contracting forces will still be arriving during this phase and the majority 
of support will still be provided by established support contracts. Contingency 
contracting teams will directly support their units with smaller, rapid purchases and 
coordination for larger operation-wide contracts will be coordinated at higher levels. 
More systems support contractors will begin entering theater to maintain and support 
deployed weapon systems. 
e. Phase 4 – Stabilize 
The Stabilize Phase is required when there is not an operational civilian 
government in place. The joint force may be required to establish a governing presence 
and incorporate other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to make sure that local 
areas have a basic functioning government. The local population will need basic services, 
and contracting may be required to procure those services. The role of OCS will likely be 
significant during this phase and should be planned in advance. OCS actions are 
imperative during the stability phase and the JFC must have a detailed OCS plan for 
coordinating between multiple inter-agencies and international partners. The JFC and his/
her contracting support should focus on moving away from cost-type contracts and focus 
more on fixed-price contracts if the stability within the area of operations allows.   
Contractors employed by the joint force need to be vetted to ensure that the joint force is 
not paying adversaries for contracted services and supplies. During the Stabilize Phase, 
there should be a definitive shift between sustained combat operations and stability 
operations (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2011). These stability operations should 
focus on moving the host nation or the crisis area to a point where they can start to 
provide for themselves. The joint commander should continuously assess the situation 
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and be flexible with the strategy to ensure that regional authority is assumed by the host 
nation. The end of the Stability Phase is marked by the host nation assuming authority.   
f. Phase 5 – Enable Civil Authority 
Phase 5, Enable Civil Authority, is defined by the joint force support of the local 
legitimate governing forces in the area of operation (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 
2011). The joint force may even work under the direction of the local force to 
demonstrate the viability of the local governing force. The objective is to enable the local 
force to provide basic services to the region and to as many of its citizens as possible. 
This will include all types of NGOs and multinational organizations providing needed 
services to the locals. Actions in Phase 5 should further convince and influence the 
population’s favorability toward the local government and the U.S. objectives in the 
region (Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, 2011). U.S. policy is to support any type of 
people or government that supports freedom, an expanding economy, and the basic rule 
of law. Overall, the joint force command should serve in a supporting role for the civil 
authority and the redeployment of combat forces should occur during this phase. OCS 
support during this phase will focus on the drawdown of military forces and the 
termination and closeout of existing contracts.    
C. MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS 
The Marine Corps also uses a six-step process for planning operations that covers 
the full spectrum of military operations. The process is driven by the commander and is 
centered on the doctrine of maneuver warfare. The steps within the Marine Corps 
Planning Process usually follow one another through a certain sequence, but each step 
can have multiple functions. Additionally, these steps may overlap with each other during 
the process. Using this model to establish a common goal ensures that all elements are on 
the same page during the operation. OCS planning within MCPP could begin as early as 
the problem framing step when planners start looking for possible solutions. As a force 
enabler, contracted support may be an integral part of the solution in one or more of the 
proposed courses of action. If the commander chooses a course of action that uses 
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contracted support, then planning for that support would begin in earnest and would be 
integrated into the orders development. 
1. Problem Framing 
The Problem Framing step can begin informally or formally depending on 
guidance from the commander and the situation at hand. This step is conducted to give 
the commander a deeper understanding of the problem, so that they can visualize the 
mission and explain to their subordinates what is required. The commander will issue 
their intent during this step, and the staff officers can begin to frame the problem and 
possible solutions based on the commander’s intent. The top-down process drives the 
development of possible courses of action to deal with the problem.   
2. Course of Action (COA) Development 
The COA Development step gives the commander multiple options to attack the 
problem in a way that accomplishes their intent. Each proposed COA should be distinct 
in method and task assignment, but all COAs will incorporate the commander’s guidance 
and intent. The commander may limit the number of COAs based on time constraints or 
the complexity of the problem. Using the commander’s intent, the staff planners will 
develop these COAs through various methods and make them as detailed as time allows 
(United States Marine Corps, 1997). 
3. COA War Gaming   
During this step, the COAs that were previously developed are tested. Testing the 
COAs is accomplished through questioning between the commander and his staff, or war 
gaming the COAs against a free-thinking red cell. War gaming helps uncover potential 
issues not addressed until the adversary’s perspective is brought into the conversation. 
War gaming allows the operational environment and the adversary’s capabilities to be 
further analyzed. Completing this step can expose weaknesses with the current options 
and help the commander and staff identify the best COA to solve the problem (United 
States Marine Corps, 1997). 
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4. COA Comparison and Decision 
In this step, the commander evaluates every COA, establishes a rating system, and 
selects the COA that they believe is the most likely to result in mission accomplishment. 
The commander discusses and records the advantages and disadvantages of each COA 
with the entire planning staff. Once the commander picks a COA, they can choose to 
implement it as is, modify it, combine appropriate elements from different COAs, or 
throw them all out and go back to Step 1. With the chosen COA in place, the commander 
sits down with subordinate commanders and begins to work on specific tasks and orders 
development. 
5. Orders Development 
Orders development is the translation of the commander’s COA decision into 
written, oral, or graphic depiction so that subordinates can begin to plan. Once the order 
is completed, it will serve as the primary guide the commander uses to communicate their 
decision with their subordinate commanders (United States Marine Corps, 1997). The 
order should be a clear and simple plan that can be understood by everyone involved in 
its execution. It will direct all actions of subordinates. The chief of staff should direct all 
orders development and only allow new information to go into the order. Current policies 
and standard operating procedures should not be addressed in the order. After the order is 
developed, the staff should review it before submitting it to the commander. Doing so 
allows the staff to identify and address any problems, and make sure the order is 
following the commander’s intent. Finally, the commander will approve the order and 
order plan.   
6. Transition 
The transition step is the shift from the planning steps to the actual execution of 
the mission. Subordinate units have the concept of operations and understand what is 
expected of them. Transition begins to occur at all levels of command once an approved 
order is in place. Successful transition enables all of the subordinate units to understand 
the commander’s intent and ensures they can execute it (United States Marine Corps, 
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1997). Confirmation briefs are conducted between the commander and his subordinate 
commanders to ensure that they understand the plan and their specific responsibilities.   
D. MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR 
OCS 
Across the military services there is a consistent push to further develop and 
conduct OCS at every level. Each of the military services is at a different stage of their 
internal OCS development, but all of them are placing a great deal of emphasis on this 
subject area. While OCS is not often thought of as a traditional combat multiplier, it is 
indeed one, and as OCS development continues to improve, so too will the efficiency of 
our combat and contingency operations.   
1. Air Force 
The Air Force is currently considered to be behind the in the overall OCS process 
(Motsek, 2015). The Air Force has specific guidance from the Secretary of the Air Force 
to make OCS a priority as well as setting up the structure to facilitate it. The service is 
emphasizing Multi-Service/Joint OCS procedures, but they are also planning to have a 
specific Air Force code system to serve as guidance. Additionally, the Air Force wants to 
expand its role in planning efforts for joint contingency operations. In order to do this, it 
is working to establish formal OCS education and training for contracting personnel, and 
are looking to use lessons learned to reinforce that training (Motsek, 2015). 
By 2024, the Air Force’s goal is to be able to fully equip components with sound 
policy in order to fully integrate OCS in support of all Joint Force Operations that cover 
the full spectrum of military operations (Motsek, 2015). Achieving this goal will require 
a fully trained staff that can adapt and function within a contingency environment. The 
top three challenges to accomplishing these goals are a focused approach, attaining full 
participation across the Air Force staff, and the limited OCS exposure each element 
within the Service (Motsek, 2015). 
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2. Army 
The Army’s OCS capability is the most mature among the military services 
(Motsek, 2015). There are still challenges remaining with contracting support integration 
and contractor management OCS functions. The Army is currently trying to improve its 
process by ensuring that commanders are placing an emphasis on OCS and focusing on 
Phase 0 planning. In addition, it is looking to set mission capabilities for future forces’ 
actions and concepts through the challenges faced with warfare (Motsek, 2015). 
The Army’s 2024 goals are focused on having commercial contracting 
capabilities that work with strategic and operational plans. The intent is to have 
commanders use OCS as a tool to achieve desired outcomes—an essential part of the 
strategic planning process, not just a function of contracting. The challenges facing the 
Army are similar to those of the Air Force. All of the major elements within the Army 
must be on board and educated on the fine points of OCS. OCS is not seen as an element 
of combat readiness, so its importance is often overlooked, and thus does not get the full 
resource support that it requires (Motsek, 2015).   
3. Marine Corps 
The Marine Corps is currently in between the Air Force and the Army when it 
comes to its OCS posture. The Marine Corps has established OCS billets that provide 
contract integration and organization within each Major Subordinate Command and 
Marine Expeditionary Force. They have a formal, published OCS guide in MCRP 4011H 
and are working on additional guidance to establish OCS into the major operational and 
logistical publications. There is also an established OCS section at Headquarters Marine 
Corps that assists with logistics planning, and an established OCS operational advisory 
group that can help commanders with limited OCS support (Motsek, 2015). 
The strategy going forward for the Marine Corps is to continue to assess the OCS 
capability, and to continue to further develop and source the billets needed to support all 
OCS functions. Further, the proper execution of OCS is a true support capability that can 
be brought to the battlefield and therefore it must receive greater emphasis. All of this 
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will require OCS training at all levels of command, within individual units, planned 
operations, and within the logistics and supply schools. The 2024 vision is built upon 
previous ideas, so that as OCS matures into an operational, institutionalized logistics 
capability, it can serve as a force multiplier during contingency operations. With the 
growth of OCS, the contingency contracting force will continue to grow and integrate 
with the commander’s staff (Motsek, 2015). In order for this approach to succeed, 
commanders must take a top-down approach to highlight the importance of OCS so that it 
resonates within their command. The challenges faced by the Marine Corps are similar to 
those of the other military services, but specifically, the Marine Corps needs to move 
from a technical contracting perspective to an operational contract support perspective. 
4. Navy 
Currently the Navy self-deploys and operates forward with regional contracting 
capabilities that support its current operations. It operates with diverse contracting 
agencies without a single lead office. Given the current structure of the Navy’s 
deployments, there is a very limited deployable contracting capability within the service 
component (Motsek, 2015). 
The 2024 vision for the Navy is to refine the Navy’s OCS processes so that they 
can provide full OCS support to small contingencies (Motsek, 2015). Another goal is to 
train and provide an OCS support unit that is capable of deploying with the fleets to 
provide OCS capabilities. Additionally, the Navy wants to establish a small deployable 
contracting capability within their reserve component. In order to achieve these goals, 
they need to formalize and publish a formal Navy OCS contingency response manual. 
The Navy’s leadership must be more engaged and understand that OCS is indeed a 
critical warfighting capability. The Navy also needs to add OCS to its wargames and 
routine exercises. The Navy’s challenges are unique because it has less personnel 
resources to fill OCS billets. Traditionally, there has been a low demand for the Navy to 
develop OCS capabilities.  
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E. GAO REPORTS 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has placed DOD Contract 
Management on its “High Risk” list since 1992 (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). Historically, the GAO and some members of Congress 
have been concerned that the DOD does not have a good handle on its contracted support. 
The fact that the DOD has becoming heavily reliant on contractors—in certain 
operations, the contractor-to-troop ratio has been greater than 1:1—makes the issue even 
more critical today. Simultaneous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with 
congressional limitations on the number of boots on the ground have increased the 
DOD’s reliance on contractors. Moreover, there are no plans to stop using contractors in 
the future, and the DOD’s reliance on them will likely grow as troop levels get cut.  
In 2006, under congressional direction, the GAO began to specifically focus on 
how the DOD was integrating operational contracting support into its larger operational 
plans. Since then, the GAO has produced several reports that offer recommendations to 
improve OCS. The reports also monitor DOD progress toward those recommendations 
and other statutory requirements set forth by Congress. 
Together, two of these reports GAO 10-472, Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to 
Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations, and 
GAO 13-212, Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate 
Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning, issue more than a dozen 
recommendations for improving OCS. These recommendations address three major 
challenges surrounding DOD planning. The first issue is that guidance on Annex W is 
unclear, specifically how much detail is needed for each level of planning. The second 
challenge is that the planners who write and review the Annex W are so firmly 
entrenched in logistics realms that their work on contractor-related issues and planning is 
seldom noticed outside of their functional area until later stages of planning (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2013). The entrenchment of contracting 
subject-matter experts in the logistics realm continues despite the fact that other 
functional areas, such as intelligence and communications, also rely heavily on 
contracted support. The final issue is that only one military service, the Army, has 
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published comprehensive guidance for operational contract support, and they are also the 
only military service that has made significant efforts to train personnel in OCS planning 
and execution.  
Congress mandated that the DOD include an Annex W in all of their operational 
plans in 2006. However, in 2010, the GAO reported they “found [that] only four 
operation plans with Annex Ws have been approved and planners have drafted Annex Ws 
for an additional 30 plans” (2010, p. 4). Furthermore, most of those drafted annexes 
simply “restated broad language from existing DOD guidance on the use of contractors to 
support deployed forces” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 2). 
The GAO pointed to several causes related to this issue. The foremost cause is that “most 
operation plans contained limited information on matters such as the size and capabilities 
of the military force involved, hindering the ability of planners to identify detailed 
contract support requirements” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010, 
p. 2). In other words, if the military cannot state with credibility both how much and 
which types of contracted support are required (i.e., if they do not know their actual 
requirements), then Annex W cannot be built properly. 
Implementing this mandate is hindered by unclear guidance on how and when to 
develop contract support annexes and as the GAO reported, this “resulted in a mismatch 
in expectations between senior DOD leadership and combatant command planners 
regarding the degree to which Annex W’s will contain specific information on contract 
support requirements” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 9). 
This mismatch has occasionally led senior leadership to underestimate contract support 
requirements and left the combatant commands unprepared to provide essential oversight 
of deployed contractor personnel. To combat the lack of clarity surrounding the Annex 
W, the DOD implemented the following recommendations made at the end of the GAO 
10-472 report: 
Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to, as part of the ongoing 
revision of the Annex W template, clarify and specify the appropriate level 
of detail that should be included in an Annex W based on the degree to 
which the plan provides details on the size and capabilities of military 
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forces and how the plan envisions those forces being used. (United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 36) 
Require all base plans to include an assumption on the potential use and 
role of contractors. (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2010, p. 36) 
Identify and implement actions by the combatant commanders needed to 
ensure that planners from the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support 
Office supporting the combatant commands expand their focus to work 
with planners throughout all functional areas. (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2010, p. 2). 
These recommendations aimed directly at the Annex W template pushed DOD 
planners to recognize that without clear guidance on the level of detail required, the one-
size-fits-all contracting template was going to be ignored or abandoned in situations 
where it did not seem to fit well. Moreover, the GAO identified that it was not enough to 
write the Annex W and bury it in the operational plan. If the DOD wants planners across 
all functional areas to be planning for the footprint for all the contractors they are going 
to rely on, they need to mandate that all functional areas consider their required 
contracting support in their own plans and in the base plan for OCS. 
The GAO’s recommendations also aimed to fix another problematic aspect of the 
Annex W, which was that the only planners paying attention to it were the ones who were 
actually writing and reviewing the annex. Planners from DLA’s Joint Contingency 
Acquisition Support Office were assigned to combatant commands to help the staff plan 
for OCS. The assigned planners were embedded in those commands’ corresponding 
logistics directorates with much success. However, according to combatant command 
officials interviewed for the GAO report “because these planners are placed within the 
logistics directorates, the planners are not integrated across all functional areas and are 
not always focused on working with all planners at the combatant commands to enable 
planning for the use of contracted support” (United States Government Accountability 
Office, 2013, p. 28). The Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) 
planners in some combatant commands tended to “focus on integrating operational 
contract support into the logistics annex and Annex W sections of plans and are not 
involved in other areas such as communications or intelligence, which are areas that also 
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have relied on contracted support in recent operations” (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2013, p. 29). To ensure proper planning across all functional 
areas, the GAO (2010) made the following recommendations in its GAO 10-472 report:  
Require the base plans and non-logistics annexes of operation plans to 
address the potential need for contractor support where appropriate (e.g., 
intelligence and communications annexes).… 
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics and the Joint Staff Director for Logistics … to clarify the roles 
and missions of the joint operational contract support planners and the 
JCASO and the relationship between both functions … to take steps to 
ensure that both functions are adequately staffed and funded to meet their 
missions. (p. 36)  
The implementation of these recommendations is ongoing. In the past, planning 
for and implementing contracting support was firmly established in the logistics 
directorate. While it is true that logistics relies heavily on contracted support, and in 
many operations most contracted support goes towards logistics, it is also true that other 
functional areas rely heavily on contractors. That is why it is so important that all 
functional areas are planning for the contracted support they will employ from the 
beginning planning stages of an operation.  
The last issue that many GAO recommendations sought to address was the fact 
that only the Army has set forth complete guidance and training for OCS. This is mostly 
explained by the fact that in recent major operations the Army has been the Lead Service 
for contracting. However, as the GAO notes, JP 4-10, states that, “each [M]ilitary 
[S]ervice, under its respective military department, is responsible for planning and 
executing contracting support to its forces, unless otherwise directed by the combatant 
commander” (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 15). These 
recommendations were highlighted in GAO 13-212, and were made partly in response to 
slow implementation of the same recommendations made in GAO 10-472: 
Direct the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to provide 
comprehensive [S]ervice-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and 
Air Force that describes how each Service should integrate operational 
contract support into its respective organization to include planning for 
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contingency operations. (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2013, p. 32) 
Focus its training about operational contract support, which is currently 
focused on the logistics planners, on training all planners at the combatant 
commands and components as necessary. (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2013, p. 33). 
Work with the [M]ilitary [S]ervices as necessary to improve the level of 
expertise in operational contract support for the combatant commands’ 
components. (United States Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 
32) 
The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are still working on their Service-wide 
guidance for integrating contracted support. Completing this important task will clear the 
way for OCS subject-matter experts to impart their OCS knowledge to planners in all 
functional areas of the combatant commands and improve their level of expertise. 
Improving the level of training of individual planners will lead to better planning for 
contracted support, better management of contracts, and better support for and 
accountability of the contractors themselves. This is not to say that the training offered is 
not adequate, rather the issue is that many of the planners who are involved with OCS 
have not yet been trained due to the high volume of people who need training. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a thorough review on the methods for implementing OCS 
and evaluated the three tenets that make up OCS. In addition, the Joint and Marine Corps 
Planning processes were analyzed and the roles of OCS within each phase were 
highlighted. The current service component posture was reviewed and their plans for 
moving forward were noted along with where the GAO has identified as problem areas. 
The next section will explain the reasoning behind how and why we chose to examine the 
case study.   
 31 
III. METHODOLOGY 
To properly construct the case study for this research, we first needed to identify 
the specific topics and themes we wanted the case study to present. In the exploratory 
phase, we determined that the case study should identify how the OCS process can affect 
the success of a contract from the planning stage to the final closeout (the primary effect), 
as well as the effect of that contract’s outcome in Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels (secondary and tertiary 
effects). To narrow the field, the United States Marine Corps was chosen as an ideal 
environment to analyze how OCS is being conducted at the various levels on conflict. 
The Marine Corps is unique because the number of uniformed personnel that serve in a 
contracting capacity is very small. This limited number of contracting personnel is 
relevant to our research because these Marines serve as the OCS promoter and subject 
matter expert for each command. To write our case study, we identified a Marine who 
has held the contracting billets applicable to the scope of the case study. By analyzing 
OCS outcomes from the Marine Corps’ perspective, we seek to educate senior officers 
(particularly those slated for command billets) about the negative effects of improper (or 
absent) OCS management on their mission outcomes. Although the case study focuses on 
the organizational analysis of the Marine Corps’ OCS process in a joint environment, the 
concepts and ideas are universal and are relevant to all commanders who operate in such 
an environment.   
A. INTERVIEW PROCESS 
We conducted an interview to gather the data necessary to build the case study. 
The individual we interviewed was in a unique position to provide our group with 
specific OCS information that enabled us to build our case study. The Marine is a field 
grade officer who held the billet of Operational Contract Support OIC while deployed in 
support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Officers in the Marine Corps contracting 
community hold the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of 3006 as a secondary 
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MOS. This structure allows its officers to have a dual career path and ensures that they 
have an understanding of unit requirements at the tactical and operation level.   
The physical interview process occurred aboard Marine Corps Base, Camp 
Lejeune, North Carolina. The interviewee was given the interview questions one week 
prior to the face-to-face interview. A few days prior to the interview, the interviewee 
wrote out his answers to those questions and returned them to the interviewers. The 
interviewers were able to use the answers to these questions to ask clarifying questions in 
order to fully understand the answers. Additionally, the interviewee was able to fully 
explain his experiences with particular contracts that form the basis of the case study. 
There were three interviewers and one individual was interviewed.   
B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Appendix B contains the questions that were presented to the interviewee, our 
subject matter expert. These questions serve as the source of information for the case 
study. Each question is designed to be broad enough to elicit as much tangible 
information as possible, but specific enough to keep the conversation focused on OCS. 
While properly conducted OCS can have positive effects on contractor performance and 
mission outcomes, it is difficult to determine whether successes are solely a function of 
properly conducted OCS. Therefore, the interview questions are designed to find 
contracts that had poor performance or result, and analyze the degree to which OCS was 
conducted. This allowed the interviewers to determine actions that would have (1) 
improved the chances of a successful acquisition (primary effect), and (2) positively 
impacted the tactical, operational, or strategic mission (secondary and tertiary effects). In 
short, the goal of the interview was to find a contracting situation that would address the 
problems associated with poorly executed OCS. 
C. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES 
The interview responses were analyzed to determine the degree to which OCS 
was conducted for a particular requirement. The successes and failures were analyzed to 
provide content for the case study. Analyzing the OCS process, in particularly focusing 
on the main pillars of OCS (contract support integration, contracting support, and 
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contractor management), allows a student to understand the basics of OCS and how to 
properly execute its functions as a commander or while in a staff billet. The case study 
was also framed so that an individual who is not familiar with contracting can grasp the 
importance of OCS in a contingency environment. The goal of the case study is not to 
give student a thorough understanding of the inner workings of the contracting process. 
However, students should be able to recognize the capabilities that successful OCS 
planning can bring to an operational environment, as well as the potential pitfalls of 
relying on contracted support without properly planning for contracted support. Students 
should come away with a basic understanding of how and why OCS needs to be 
integrated into all phases of operations planning, and their roles as stakeholders in the 
OCS process.  
D. CASE STUDY PREPARATION 
In order to design and create the case study, we focused on the qualitative data of 
an individual contract and its associated OCS functions and mission outcomes. The case 
study will show how contract performance and the overall warfighting mission can suffer 
when failures occur in the OCS process. The case study will also show that unforeseen 
problems may arise in contract performance even when OCS is properly conducted (Yin, 
2014).   
Case studies are meant to link the case’s data to some concepts of interest (here, 
OCS functions and outcomes) and allow the concepts to give the reader a sense of 
direction to analyze the data. The analytic technique we chose to use is called explanation 
building. Explanation building is a technique that is designed to “explain a phenomenon 
to stipulate a presumed set of causal links about it, or how or why something happened” 
(Yin, 2014, p. 17). The casual link we are trying to establish is that properly conducted 
OCS will mitigate future contracted support issues and contribute to overall mission 
success. The case study relies on a narrative style to present the facts of the case. The 
case study utilizes a format that presents the outcome of the contracting action upfront, 
showing the issues that arose and how it affected the requirements generators at the 
tactical level. It then follows a chronological path starting from the requirements 
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generation process through contract award. This format effectively provides an 
explanation that allows the reader to understand the effect prior to understanding the 
cause. By having the effect presented first, critical thought will be spurred, allowing the 
reader to recognize problems within the process that lead to the known conclusion. While 
the case is based on an actual event and contract, content was added to ensure that the 
narrative flowed easily, allowing the readers to follow the story. 
E. CONCLUSION 
 In order to write a case study a writer should understand what it is they want the 
reader to understand upon its completion. To spur critical thinking from the audience, a 
scenario was chosen that would assist the reader in understanding that particular actions 




1. Introduction and Instructions for Use 
The following case study shows just how reliant the DOD has become on 
contracted support. The case study also depicts the potential fallout of a failure to 
complete even a small task in the OCS process. The case study is based on real events 
and a real contract, but some details have been changed for clarity and to enable learning 
objectives. This case study should be read after an introduction to the OCS process and 
an explanation of how OCS fits into the operations planning process. Ideally, students 
will have the questions while they read the case study and the responses to those 
questions will serve as the basis for a vigorous in-class discussion led by the instructor.  
2. 29 January 2013 
It was dark and cold on the night of 29 January 2013. With a new moon 
forecasted, the squad leaders of 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines checked and rechecked their 
squad’s night optics. At midnight, their squads were going to be responsible for the safety 
and security of the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). The contract for the private security 
company that had been standing watch was set to expire without a contract extension, and 
the contracted guards were coming down from their posts at 2400. Team leaders checked 
to make sure their Marines had the minimum 180 rounds of ammunition, because this late 
into a deployment, some Marines were tempted to carry less weight. After all, they were 
just going to be manning guard towers, and that was nothing compared to the clearing 
operations and near constant patrolling that they had been doing. 
As the Marines suited up and prepared to assume security, conversations buzzed 
at all ranks. Until recently, these Marines had been out in small forward operating bases 
all over the area of operations. With an impending drawdown of forces, the forward bases 
had been closed. The Marines were supposed to be sleeping comfortably at Camp 
Leatherneck, a short stop on their way back to the United States. At the squad level, the 
Marines complained about being tired and guessed at who had screwed up the contract. 
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They expounded upon what they would have done differently and what they were going 
to do if they missed the Super Bowl. Mostly they just wondered how in the world the 
private security guys could get paid so much and then just stop the minute their contract 
expired. The Marines had been patrolling tirelessly and eating nothing but MREs and 
GREs for months. The last thing they wanted to do was suit up and stand watch all night 
for a guy who had been making 500 dollars a day. 
Further up the chain of command, the battalion staff and company commanders 
were briefing the Battalion Commander on the final details of the rotation plan to man the 
walls. The contracted security firm had 166 guards and 14 other management personnel 
to meet the requirement. This would mean that an entire rifle company, and then some, 
had to be tasked to securely man the ASP.   
The loss of an entire company was detrimental to the overall combat power for 
the battalion. If the battalion received any further tasks to conduct security patrols or 
other combat efforts, the battalion would have to execute these actions a full company 
short. Even if they did not receive any further tasks, the battalion commander still had a 
company of Marines working around the clock, while his other companies prepared to go 
home. He knew this would damage not only his mission readiness, but also to the overall 
morale of the troops. His Marines were tired and he knew it. 
3. Background  
In 2011, Second Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (II MEF) assumed 
command of Regional Command South-West (RC(SW)) which was composed of 
Helmand and Nimruz Provinces located in southwest Afghanistan. Camp Leatherneck 
was the home base for a multi-national force, which included Marines, the forces of 
several NATO members, as well as the Afghan National Army. A combination of the 
pressure to maintain a high operational tempo and the pressure to keep troop levels low 
had led the DOD to contract out base security at most major bases throughout 
Afghanistan. Camp Leatherneck was no exception. 
However, instead of putting in place a theater-wide contract for base security, 
each regional command generated, vetted, and planned their own requirements and 
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submitted them through their individual procurement processes. In 2011, military leaders 
generated a requirement for security services at the ASP on Camp Leatherneck in order to 
keep uniformed forces focused on combat operations throughout the AOR. After nearly 
ten years of operating in austere environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the pitfalls in the 
initial stages of the OCS process, in particular Contract Support Integration, were largely 
known. II MEF leaders undoubtedly understood that if security services could not be 
provided by private contractors, Marines who were employed in support of operational 
and tactical missions throughout RC(SW) would need to be reallocated to provide 
security for the ASP. 
4. Planning for Operational Contract Support 
The requirement for security services was vetted through what was then called the 
Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB), which is similar to the current Joint 
Requirements Review Board (JRRB). Because of the high dollar value and the extra 
scrutiny given to all security contracts in the aftermath security firm mishaps in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, this contract was also reviewed through the Combined 
Acquisition Review Board, which was convened at the United States Forces-Afghanistan 
level. These boards satisfied a key task in the Contract Support Integration phase that 
allowed the commanders and planners to validate and prioritize their contracting 
requirements.   
The requirements generation, requirements review board, and OCS integration 
resulted in a contract awarded 30 January 2012 by the U.S. Army Contracting 
Command—Rock Island (ACC-RI). This contract, awarded to a well-known private 
security company, was worth over 84 million dollars. The contract included a base year 
and four option periods, with the base year starting 30 January 2012 through 29 January 
2013 and all options culminating 29 January 2017. 
Per the original contract, the contractor was required to provide a total 180 people 
to execute the following billets: armed security guard, guard team supervisor, shift 
supervisor, operations officer and site manager. These personnel were required to be at 
least 25 years of age, fluent in English and qualified on the M9 Beretta (9 mm), M16 or 
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M4 (5.56 mm), as well as M240 medium machinegun, M2 .50-caliber heavy 
machinegun, and Mk19 40 mm heavy machinegun.   
The contractors performed services that included manning perimeter defense 
positions and designated entry control points (ECPs) to conduct surveillance and to 
prevent threats and unauthorized personnel from entering the installation. They also 
provided roving patrols to operate in accordance with the installation’s base defense plan. 
For 25 million dollars per year, the support provided by this contract allowed a line 
infantry company to focus on operations “outside of the wire” instead of pulling constant 
guard duty at the ASP. A larger, concurrent contract awarded to the same security firm 
provided security services support to Camp Dwyer and FOB Delaram II, freeing up an 
additional two infantry companies. The performance work statement (PWS) was 
straightforward and easy to follow.   
A major task during the contract support integration phase was determining the 
government furnished support for 180 new contractors. DOD policy generally requires 
the contracted company to provide all the support necessary to perform the contracted 
tasks. However, in austere and hostile environments such as Afghanistan, the U.S. 
Government found it more efficient to use existing contracts for life support to support 
contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF personnel).2 Thus, OCS planners 
had to work closely with units overseeing base services to ensure they were prepared to 
account for the billeting and sustainment of 180 extra people. Typical billeting and 
sustainment requirements included living quarters, bathroom/shower facilities, laundry 
service, as well as access to the dining facilities, gym, and morale, welfare, and recreation 
centers. One planner estimated that housing and feeding one person on Camp 
Leatherneck cost 100 dollars per day.   
OCS planners also coordinated the particulars for the training, security, mobility, 
deployment and redeployment of these contractors with various entities. Usually this 
coordination involved ensuring contractors completed the theatre entrance requirements 
                                                 
2 CAAF personnel are contractors and subcontractors who are U.S. citizens or third country nationals 
who do not normally reside within the operational area. By comparison, non-CAAF personnel are generally 
local nationals working as contractors or subcontractors.    
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on time and turned in all of their equipment before departing. Coordination also involved 
ensuring that the requirements generators and vendors were familiar with procedures to 
move around the AOR as well as how to track the location of each contractor in theater. 
A failure to coordinate the smallest detail could disrupt performance of the entire contract 
and potentially harm the mission. Moreover, Marine Corps OCS planners working in 
Afghanistan in 2012 had the unique challenge of balancing current requirements with an 
inevitable mission drawdown.  
Through each stage of the drawdown, operations planners in conjunction with 
OCS advisors had to scrutinize the number of contractors on every service contract to 
determine if the service they provide was still critical, or if the contractors providing the 
service could be sent home in support of drawdown operations. This was challenging for 
a couple reasons (1) because redeployment timelines are fluid and (2) because what is 
considered “critical” is subjective.  
5. Post-award Contract Management  
In late 2012, OCS planners were dealing with all of the issues and challenges that 
come with managing a large number of contracts in a contingency environment. These 
challenges include ensuring contractors actually left the base once their contract had 
expired, making sure that contracted companies had not accidentally (or purposefully) 
hired the enemy. Another common challenge in the contingency environment was 
figuring out ways for local national firms to be paid in a timely manner without the 
convenience of electronic transactions.  
OCS advisors and contracting officers were also busy mentoring and interacting 
with their Contract Officer Representatives (COR). CORs are non-contracting uniformed 
personnel chosen by their commands to be responsible for ensuring their contractors are 
performing contracted work satisfactorily, and not performing tasks outside of their 
duties. Because serving as a COR was usually a collateral duty, ensuring that the CORs 
were properly monitoring a contract’s performance could be difficult. OCS planners also 
had to coordinate closely with operations and logistics planners to ensure that the level of 
contracted support matched the ever-changing requirements in the area of operations. 
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Moreover, tensions were high on Camp Leatherneck in October 2012. Just weeks earlier 
19 Taliban had raided the eastern side of the Camp Leatherneck/Camp Bastion complex, 
killed two Marines and destroyed or damaged six AV-8B Harriers before being killed in a 
counter attack. In the aftermath of the attacks, an investigation of whether or not the base 
had been adequately defended began. While senior leadership grappled with these issues, 
the role of contracted security aboard Camp Leatherneck remained an open question. 
Should more security contractors be hired to fill manning gaps? Should all base security 
be performed by uniformed personnel?  What could have been done to prevent these 
attacks? 
As October turned into November, OCS planners began to push senior leadership 
more intensely for a decision about exercising the first option year on the ASP contract. 
That decision was answered affirmatively in late November 2012. Knowing the tight 
deadline, the OCS chief sent the paperwork to the contracting officer from ACC-RI that 
option was to be exercised so that the contracting officer could notify the vendor of the 
government’s intent. 
Back in Rock Island, December came and went with no action by the contracting 
officer. That office did not know if II MEF planned on exercising the option or not. The 
paperwork requesting that the option be exercised was sitting in an inbox of someone 
who was on leave. Though it is a fairly simple process that at its most basic level simply 
requires the contracting officer to release a modification to exercise the option, the 
holiday season had severely delayed the process. Because of the delay, the contracting 
officer had not notified the vendor of the government’s intent and now both the 
contracting officer and the vendor would have to agree to sign the paperwork to exercise 
the option.  
As the end of January began to draw near, the lead II MEF OCS planner and his 
chief were now heavily involved. By federal regulation, if the modification to exercise 
the option is not completed prior to the expiration of the base or previous option year, 
then the entire contract ends, and a new contract must be awarded—a process that can 
take months. The calls from Afghanistan to the stateside office in Rock Island began to 
increase in both frequency and urgency. In mid-January, the lead OCS planner for II 
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MEF, fearing that the option would not be exercised in time, advised senior leadership 
that they needed to begin planning to secure the ASP without the use of civilian 
contractors. By the final week of January, with the modification still un-released, military 
leaders pulled a company of infantry Marines back to Camp Leatherneck in order to 
prepare them to take over guarding the ASP. The OCS chief was on the phone with Rock 
Island and the vendor as the Marines from 3rd Battalion 4th Marines were suiting up to 
stand post.   
Ultimately, the OCS chief was able to get the contracting officer from Rock 
Island and the vendor to work together, exercising the option prior to the expiration of the 
contract. The option was exercised at 11:30 PM local time and the Marines that were 
slated to man the security perimeter at the ASP were allowed to stand down. The private 
contractors, happy that they still had jobs, continued to provide security, and the battalion 
commander’s combat power was again at 100 percent. 
B. EPILOGUE  
While slightly less dramatic, the push to get option year two exercised in January 
2014 was just as fraught for Camp Leatherneck’s OCS Cell. As 2013 drew to a close, 
senior USMC leadership in RC(SW) were satisfied with the contractor’s performance and 
acknowledged that they depended on the security work provided by the private security 
company to maintain their operational tempo while ensuring that their bases were 
protected. 
However, all eyes were on Kabul as the U.S. worked to convince President Hamid 
Karzai to sign the bilateral security agreement, which would have a major effect on troop 
levels in Afghanistan beyond 2014. The planners were mindful of the aggressive 
drawdown plan that would close Camp Leatherneck and extract the Marine Corps from 
Helmand Province sometime in the next year. As the Marine Corps’ mission in 
Afghanistan drew to a close, reliance on contractors became even more critical to sustain 
ongoing operations. Parts of Camp Leatherneck had already begun to be torn down and 
plans were in the works to shrink the outer perimeter. Thus, while the decision to exercise 
option year two and extend the contract into 2014 had been made, details concerning 
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exactly how many contractors would be required to remain during option year two (and 
when they would eventually leave Camp Leatherneck) still had to be worked out.  
In the end, it was decided that the contractors would be among the last to leave 
Camp Leatherneck in October 2014. Option year two was partially funded through 1 
October 2014 and exercised on 29 January 2014. As option year one ended at midnight 
30 January 2014, contractors with the private security company quietly changed shifts. 
With the possible exception of the OCS cell, the Marines of Camp Leatherneck did not 
even notice.   
C. CONCLUSION 
This case exemplifies the importance of the contracted support that the DOD 
relies on so heavily. Failure to execute an option, a task that any contracting officer will 
agree is exceedingly straightforward, almost derailed the base security plan for Camp 
Leatherneck and negatively affected the ability of II MEF to project combat power. One 
of the main issues in this case was that the contracting office in Rock Island was 
operating in a garrison environment, but supporting a warzone halfway across the world. 
It was extremely difficult for the requirements generator and the garrison contracting 
office to communicate effectively due to the contrast in their respective conditions, 
differences in time zones, the normal bureaucracy of workflows, and, importantly, the 
understanding of the relative importance of requirements.   
This is why senior leadership involvement in the OCS process is so critical at all 
stages. In contrast to the idea that more senior leadership will bog down the process, 
senior leadership involvement in OCS is actually a predictor of success due to their 
unique ability to cut across organizational boundaries. A well-timed email or phone call 
from the right senior leader can facilitate expedient contract actions and ensure that 
routine tasks like exercising an option are prioritized appropriately. With just a basic 
understanding of OCS planning and the procurement process, a senior leader can be an 
invaluable asset to the entire process. Engaged senior leaders are uniquely positioned to 
help prioritize and define requirements and can help project managers hold all 
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stakeholders accountable for completing required tasks throughout each step of the 
process. 
The case study shows how that failure to complete a simple task in the OCS 
process can reverberate throughout an operational area. It also touches on the various 
factors that can affect the decision to use private contractors to performs certain tasks. 
The discussion questions provided in the next chapter are designed to make students 
think more deeply about the implications of the use of contracted personnel in operational 
environments.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
The following discussion questions may be utilized to facilitate higher learning 
through critical thinking. Provided below each question are brief instructor-led talking 
points to promote higher-level discussion. 
 
Q1. Why were contractors being used to guard the ammunition supply point 
(ASP)? Using your knowledge of OCS, discuss how to properly plan for, 
execute, and manage this contract in theater. 
 
Contractors were used to guard the ASP because the Marine Corps 
determined that Marine forces could be better employed in critical 
operations elsewhere within the theater. The contractors provided the 
Marine Corps with an efficient and cost effective solution to managing a 
low-risk requirement. This tactic has been employed more frequently as 
troop caps have become a political tool to measure United States 
involvement in an area. 
 
To properly plan, execute, and manage this contract, a staff should utilize 
the tenants of OCS: contract support integration, contracting support, and 
contractor management.   
 
Contract Support Integration 
The first step is identifying the requirement and the best way to source it. 
Write the SOW/PWS and ensure the document meets the desired end-state. 
Plan for and budget the cost of the first fiscal year requirement. Next, 
conduct the boards, working groups, and all other meetings to ensure that 
the presence of the contractors is justified. Decide who will supervise the 
contract the training requirements for the contracting officer 
representative. Work with logistics planners to identify how life support 
will be provided to the contractors.   
 
Contracting Support 
Once the period of performance has started, the COR will ensure contract 
compliance. If the contractor is not in compliance, the COR should 
consult with the contracting officer in order to identify and initiate the 






Once a contract has been awarded, coordinating the movement of 
personnel and equipment must begin. As the contractors arrive in theater, 
the COR will need to ensure that they are properly processed through the 
theater processing system in accordance with the rules and regulations. 
When the contract’s period of performance is ending, the COR must also 
facilitate the contractors’ transition out of theater. This includes out-
processing and returning the contractor to their deployment point of 
origin. 
 
Q2. In this case study, all stakeholders knew the base year of the security 
contract was ending, but nothing was done to exercise the option year until 
the last minute. What kind of dialogue should have been happening 
between the Marine Corps and the Army’s Contracting Command?  What 
sort of relationship should the two units have to facilitate support?  What 
are the pros and cons of having garrison-based contracting officers writing 
and administering contracts for a contingency environment? 
 
Operational Contract Support cannot be successful without the entire 
commander’s staff being involved. Knowing how OCS works, as well as 
understanding which structure the GCC has chosen to implement (LSCC, 
LSC, JTSCC) is critical for proper contract planning and management. 
Commanders should task their staff and their OCS coordinators to 
produce a list of “critical contracts” that could impact mission readiness. 
Once these contracts have been identified, it is imperative for the 
commander to ensure that they are properly managed so that his mission 
readiness is not negatively impacted. The staff also must ensure they are 
aware of critical timelines associated with these contracts so they can 
warn commanders if an important deadline is about to be missed. A single 
phone call from the commander in Afghanistan to the commander of the 
Army Contracting Command could have solved the option execution 
problem and prevented it from going to that last critical hour.   
 
There are significant benefits and limitations to having a reach back 
setup. The most obvious benefit is that garrison based contracting offices 
experience less turnover than contingency contracting offices, which 
allows for continuity throughout the life of the contract. However, the 
priorities of a garrison-based office are not always well matched with the 
priorities of a combatant commander. The example in the case study 
highlights this issue. The security contract sitting on a desk in a cubicle 
does not have the same level of importance in a garrison environment as it 
would in a contingency office where the contracting officer is more 
intimately involved with the requirement. 
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Q3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the military relying so 
heavily on the assistance of contractors?   
 
Contractors provide a flexible force that can be brought aboard a mission 
quickly, and then just as easily be removed. Moreover, they can be used to 
provide still necessary capabilities in the face of mandatory troop 
drawdowns. Despite the laborious contracting process, contractors 
provide the government a flexible solution to support requirements, 
particularly in comparison to utilizing government personnel. 
 
A few examples of how contractors provide a flexible solution are: 1) 
Contractors provide highly skilled, highly technical jobs not typically 
performed within the government; 2) A mission may require the short-term 
use of a skilled professional, and contractors are perfect for filling 
temporary roles;  3) Contractors may provide logistical services that the 
government cannot provide in a cost effective manner;  4)  Contractors 
are typically cheaper in the long run than hiring full time government 
employees (no need to pay healthcare costs, retirement benefits, etc.).   
 
Examples of disadvantages include: 1) Contractors are not members of 
the chain of command, and thus are typically harder to manage than full 
time government employees; 2) All services have to be agreed upon within 
the SOW or PWS—contractors are not required to perform “other duties 
as assigned;” 3) Performance has to be consistently monitored, which 
requires assignment of a government COR; and 4) The process of putting  
a contract in place may be lengthy.   
 
Q4. The ratio of private contractors to uniformed personnel during military 
operations has occasionally been greater than 1:1. Is this appropriate? 
Should there be a limit on the number of contractors in an operational 
theatre? What are the implications of limiting the number of contractors? 
 
The students should discuss the role of contractors in theater and how the 
quantity of contractors relates to the nation’s overall campaign mission. 
What happens to the strategy if the number of contractors is raised or 
lowered? If a limit is put on the number of contractor personnel in an 
operation, either more uniformed personnel will be needed to carry out 
the operation, or the scope of the operation must be limited.  
 
Students should discuss how the decision to raise or lower troop levels is 
affected by the ability of contractors to provide services during an 
operation. Students may also note that discussions about lowering troop 
levels are seemingly meaningless if troops are simply going to be replaced 
by contractor personnel, many of whom are also American citizens. 
 48 
However, recent experience suggests that Congress is only interested in 
force caps as they relate to military forces, not contractors. 
 
Q5. What about the effects of hiring local contractors? What are the benefits 
and limitations?   
 
Hiring local contractors to provide services has several benefits and 
limitations.  Providing the local populace with jobs can help spur the local 
economy and build faith towards the US’ mission.  It also helps reduce the 
number of military age males that can be recruited by our adversaries to 
engage in acts counter to the U.S. mission.  However, hiring locals often 
involves negative security implications.  This case study took place while 
the Green on Blue attacks were surging in Afghanistan and many of the 
locals simply could not be trusted.  There were multiple examples of local 
Afghan contractors who were actually part of the Taliban. Granting 
access to local nationals allows them to be in close proximity to critical 
infrastructure and personnel. Negative security effects should be carefully 
weighed against positive economic and security effects. 
 
Q6. What needs to be done to gain approval for having armed personnel? 
Would a regional security contract have been better?  Would managing it 
in theater be a better option? 
 
A regional security contract could have given the base commander and his 
staff a greater situational picture of the details behind the base security 
contract.  However, base security should be high enough on a 
commander’s priority list that everyone on the staff is aware of the 
timeline associated with the contract and works to ensure the option is 
exercised in a timely manner.  Managing the contract in theatre would 
have also eliminated the time zone gap between offices and would have 
also allowed the local contracting office to have a vested interest in 
ensuring the option year did not lapse.  There simply is not the same level 
of interest when the contract is being managed in a contracting office 
inside the United States far away from the actual conflict. Depending on 
the theater and conflict, setting up a contract for armed personnel may 










Q7. What factors should be taken into consideration when deciding whether to 
hire private contractors to perform a task rather than uniformed personnel?  
Are there tasks that contractors should never be able to perform?  Which 
tasks would you prefer contractors to perform instead of uniformed 
personnel? 
 
To begin the discussion, it is important to explain what “inherently 
governmental functions” are, how they apply, and what that has to do with 
contracted work and the amount of acceptable risk. Students may be 
directed to Federal Acquisition Part 7.5 to review a list of inherently 
governmental functions that are not to be performed by contractors. FAR 
7.5 also lists tasks that are not considered inherently governmental 
functions. Neither list is all-inclusive; students might discuss other tasks 
that need to be included on either of the lists.  
 
FAR 7.5 can be found at: (https://www.acquisition.gov/?q=browsefar)  
Other factors students should think about are costs, whether or not the 
extra contractor personnel can be sustained in the area, how contractor 
personnel will be protected if the task is to be performed in a hostile 
environment, and whether there are enough uniformed personnel who are 
qualified to complete the task.  
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OTHER TOPICS FOR STUDY 
We recommend that other Naval Postgraduate School students add to this 
research by analyzing OCS within combatant commands. During our research, it was 
determined that many standard operating procedures governing OCS were driven by 
individuals and not necessarily military service guidance. The joint publications provide a 
framework to follow, but there is very little literature regarding each individual military 
service’s plans for implementing OCS policies outside of the joint environment.   
Another topic for research might focus on the complex effort of managing 
contractor personnel in theater. The DOD appears to have a challenging time dealing with 
the complex issue of contractors moving into, out of, and throughout the AOR. An 
analysis of how to overcome this problem without creating a bureaucratic nightmare 
would benefit both contractors and the DOD. 
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C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The challenges facing the United States Military are as difficult today as at any 
time in our history. The United States confronts a variety of threats across the globe, in 
different tactical environments and styles of conflict. In this complex environment, 
reliance on contractors to perform services that were traditionally performed by 
uniformed personnel has persistently increased. Utilizing contracted support to the fullest 
extent allows for the maximum amount of uniformed personnel to be engaged in an 
operational capacity while still ensuring essential combat service support. The ever-
increasing need for contracted support makes every dollar that the acquisition community 
spends critical to the security of the nation. By properly planning and managing OCS, the 
probability of mission success is greatly enhanced and the United States’ taxpayers 
receive a sound return on their investment.   
OCS is still a relatively new concept and is not yet fully implemented in the 
military services’ strategic plans. All four military services are working towards their 
2024 implementation goals. It is critical that the DOD continues to provide top-down 
guidance and a strategic vision for all military services’ OCS execution. 
Implementing OCS throughout the strategic planning process will aid the JFC 
through every phase of the operation and lead to greater efficiency in achieving desired 
mission effects. As this case study revealed, failure at the strategic level can have huge 
implications at the tactical level. Operating as efficiently as possible at the strategic level 
will leave the JFC with more resources to apply at the tactical level. Conversely, failing 
to properly plan for the use of contracted support can result in dangerous and unintended 
consequences—from inadvertently contracting with the enemy to the accidental 
economic destabilization of the area of operation.  
Commanders should drive and enforce the management of OCS in their 
commands and make it a fundamental part of operational planning. All staff sections have 
a role in OCS planning. OCS cannot succeed without all stakeholders taking an active 
role in forecasting, developing, and managing requirements and their associated 
contracts. The OCS process is truly a “cradle to the grave” team effort—an effort that 
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does not begin or end within the Contracting career field or with the letting of a contract. 
This case study serves an important reminder of just how important contracted support is 
to an operation and how every element of a command must strive to incorporate OCS 
into mission planning and execution.   
Commanders who properly plan for and manage their contracted support will find 
that contracted support can be a cheaper and more effective alternative to the use of 
military members or government civilians to perform certain required tasks. Those 
commanders can expect to see significant increases in their combat power and 
operational capabilities, as well as an increased probability for mission success. 
Commanders and staff at all levels must have an understanding of the OCS process in 
order to take advantage of the myriad benefits offered by contracted support and to thrive 
in the current DOD environment where reliance on contracted support will continue to 
grow. 
The case study was also designed so that a JPME student who is unfamiliar with 
contracting can understand the importance of OCS in a contingency environment. While 
one objective of the case study is to show the second and third order effects of the failure 
to complete even small tasks within the OCS process, the overall goal of the case study 
is not to make student the student an expert on the intricacies of the contracting 
process. However, students should be able to recognize the capabilities that 
contracted support brings to an operational environment while being mindful of the 
consequences of poorly planned contracted support. Students should come away from 
reading the case study and follow on discussion with a basic understanding of how 
and why OCS needs to be integrated into all phases of operations planning.  
The case study also seeks to display the weight of current events and the political 
climate has on the decision to use uniformed personnel or private contractor to perform a 
task. It is the authors’ intent that up and coming senior military leaders are educated on 
the implications of using contracted support in an operational environment. This 
education is best provided before those leaders must make the decision of  whether or not 
to use contracted support in their own missions.  
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APPENDIX 
A. ANNEX W – OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT (TEMPLATE) 
 
 
HEADQUARTERS, XX COMMAND 
    ADDRESS 
    XX XXX 20XX 
 
ANNEX W TO XX COMMAND OPLAN/OPORD XXXX-XX 
OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
 
(U)  References: List all applicable references essential to this annex.  [List all key 
OCS related regulations, policies, instructions, messages to include higher level Annex 
Ws when applicable. JFC specific OCS references can be found via the Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy Area of Responsibility portal available via the 
following link http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/areas_of_responsibility.html. Service 
components should include applicable Service and/or command specific references.]  
 
1.  (U) Situation: 
 
a.  (U) Enemy. Provide threat level assessment as it relates to OCS. Also see 
Annex B (Intelligence). [This section should include a short assessment of the estimated 
impact of the potential threats to utilizing contract support in the operation to include 
such information as threats from the use of local national employees to provide on-base 
services, threats that would require armed security to protect contracted services, etc.] 
 
b.  (U) Friendly. List major contract support related commands and agencies 
involved in this operation, but not under the C2 this command; include their key 
OCS related tasks. [Include organizations such as USTRANSCOM, DLA, DCMA, 
DCAA and other governmental agencies impacting or influencing OCS actions such as 
American Embassies and USAID operating in the projected operational area. Include 
basic information on the OCS related authorities, capabilities of each organization]  
 
c.  (U) Commercial Business Environment. Provide a brief description of the 
general business environment and estimated impact on the ability to utilize 
commercial support in the designated operational area. [Based on a coordinated 
GCC, Service component, construction agent and CSA OCS preparation of the 
operational environment efforts, this paragraph should include information on such 
things as existing DOD contracts, estimated local and in-transit commercial capabilities, 
local electronic banking capabilities, etc.] 
 
 54 
d. (U) Assumptions. State valid and necessary assumptions.  [Briefly describe key 
OCS related planning assumptions based on threat assessment, commercial business 
environment, host nation/international and multinational considerations and any 
established OCS related facts.]  
 
e. (U) Limiting Factors. State all key limited factors to include specific 
constraints and restraints.  [Based on threat assessment, commercial business 
environment research and any established OCS related facts and assumptions, list 
specific OCS related limiting factors such as status of forces agreements (SOFAs) 
restrictions (e.g., a SOFA that limits the number of U.S. or third country national 
contractors allowed in country), general business environment (e.g., lack of established 
electronic banking systems), etc.] 
  
2.  (U) Mission. See base plan. 
 
3. (U) Execution   
 
a. (U) Concept of Contract Support Operations. Provide a broad concept of 
OCS integration and oversight for this operation. [This sub-paragraph includes a 
general overview of how contracting supports the operation and articulates the 
commander’s priorities, intent and specific OCS command guidance by phase of 
operation (e.g., ensure maximum use of local national commercial sources and 
employees in phase IV) by type of contract support or other logical manner. This section 
should also address the overall contract support arrangements (e.g., support to own 
Services, lead Service or Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (JTSCC), contract 
support related restrictions (by phase, location, function, guidance on use of/transition 
from Service CAP support, etc. Include description how OCS achieves or helps to 
achieve desired operational effects.]   
 
(1) (U) Guidance on utilization of types of contracted support. 
 
(a) (U) Systems Support Contracts. Provide any specific guidance on 
use of system support contracts in this operation. [This sub-paragraph(s) addresses 
any command guidance/restrictions on the use of Service weapon systems support 
contracts. Use caution in placing any restrictions on the use of system support contracts 
since most of these contract are critically important in maintaining weapon and support 
system readiness.] 
 
(b) (U) External Support Contracts. Provide any specific guidance on 
use of external support contracts in this operation.   [This sub-paragraph addresses 
general guidance on the use of major external support contracts (e.g., DLA, 
USTRANSCOM, etc.) and Service Civil Augmentation Programs (e.g., Army Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program; Air Force Capabilities Program [AFCAP]; and Navy’s 
Global Contingency Construction Contract [GCCC] and Global Contingency Services 
Contract [GCSC]). This section will also include commander’s guidance on the 
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transition of Civil Augmentation Program support to theater support contracting by 
phase of operation where appropriate. The GCC and/or sub-JFC Annex W may refer to 
the appropriate Service component Annex Ws for a more detailed description of planned 
Civil Augmentation Program support (e.g., Army Annex W may have LOGCAP plan).] 
 
(c) (U) Theater Support Contracts. Provide any specific guidance on 
use of theater support contracts in this operation.  [This sub-paragraph addresses the 
concept of theater support contracting in the joint operational area by phase of the 
operation. The GCC and/or sub-JFC Annex W should refer to related sections of the 
Annex W to include theater support contracting command tasks and Appendix 1 
Operational Contract Support Capabilities.]  
 
(2)  (U) Contingency Contracting Administrative Services (CCAS). State 
how CCAS will be performed.  (Provides direction on CCAS at the GCC level. Normal 
options include Services providing their own CCAS capability or CCAS being provided 
by DCMA per theater business clearance guidance. If CCAS is going to be performed by 
DCMA, this paragraph should refer to tasks to subordinate units and other related 
guidance (i.e., theater business clearance rules).  
 
 b. (U) Tasks To Major Subordinate Units. List major OCS related tasks for 
each Service component, JTSCC (if formed), Joint Contingency Acquisition Office 
(JCASO) mobile support team (MST)(if deployed) and CSAs to include 
identification of the lead OCS manager/integrator staff or unit and participation in 
boards, bureaus, centers, cells (B2C2W) working groups. [This sub-paragraph should 
include OCS related guidance to major subordinate commands, JTSCC (if formed) and 
CSAs not contained in other sections of the Annex W. The GCC plan should include the 
requirement for Service components and CSAs to follow GCC OCS related guidance as 
found in the DPAP AOR portal (web linked in reference section above) and other OCS 
guidance (e.g., theater business clearance rules) as applicable. Service components and 
CSAs will be required to conduct OCS planning in support of the GCC and may be 
required to submit draft CSIPs to include appropriate Tabs and Appendices. The GCC 
level plan must include OCS integration responsibilities such as BC2W responsibilities 
not already captured in GCC standard procedures and/or policies as well as lead OCS 
advisory responsibilities. Service component and CSA plans should reflect similar OCS 
integration and advisory responsibilities applicable to their subordinate organizations. 
Finally, instructions to the lead Service responsible for theater support contracting (if 
appointed) or JTSCC (if formed) must include direction to publish mission specific 
theater acquisition instruction (e.g., standard clauses, contract negotiation policy, 
pricing procedures, etc.) and responsibility to coordinate theater business  clearance 
guidance with OSD (if and when published). 
 
c. (U) Initial Guidance by Support Function. Identify major support function 
planned for commercial support sourcing. [This sub-paragraph along with the Annex 
W Tab A, Summary of Contractor Support Estimate, outlines anticipated commercial 
support sourcing by joint capability area and/or commodity. The information in the GCC 
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and/or sub-JFC Annex W should be linked to the appropriate Service component or CSA 
plan as well as to Tab A to Appendix 3 Summary of Contractor Support Estimate which 
will contain more detailed planning guidance. Specific guidance found in each section 
below is based on GCC directed lead Service directives/CSA responsibilities, JFC 
ANNEX W Concept of the Operations guidance, applicable functional supportability 
analysis data, commercial business environment analysis factors, risk assessment 
analysis and other operational factors. Each individual section below should contain 
Service component command guidance on suitability for contracted support to include 
specific restrictions and contract venue guidance (e.g., external support vice theater 
support contract type decision) by location and phase of operations as applicable and as 
directed by the GCC. The requiring activities (e.g., the Service components) will be 
responsible to develop contract statement of requirements (CSOR) that includes a 
description, location, timing, and estimated amount) for the designated supply or service. 
The CSOR template and instructions can be found at TAB C to APPENDIX F to 
ENCLOSURE F. The outline below provides specific guidance on the types of services 
that should be addressed in this paragraph.    
 
1. Non-Logistic Support 
(a) Interpreters/Linguists 







(1) Bottled Water  
(2) Class I  
(3) Class II 
(4) Class III (B/P) 
(5) Class IV 
(6) Class VIII 
(7) Class IX 
(b) Base Life Support (non-facility related) 
(1) Tactical Water Purification 
(2) Dining Facility (DFAC) Support 
(3) Class I, II, III(P), IX Supply Support Services 
(4) Morale, Welfare and Recreation  
(c) Common Equipment Maintenance 
(d) Construction/General Engineering/Facility Maintenance Support  
(e) Distribution/Transportation 
(f) Health Readiness 




d. (U) Coordinating Instructions. Provide any mission specific board, bureau, 
center, cell, working group guidance or other coordinating instructions or reports as 
necessary.   
 
4. (U) Administration and Logistics 
 
a. (U) Funding/Fund Disbursement. Address OCS related funding and fund 
disbursement arrangements. Also see Base Plan, Annex E Personnel, Appendix 3 
Finance and Disbursing. [This sub-paragraph should specify who will provide/perform 
financial management responsibilities (including resource management, comptroller) 
along with information on who will provide funding for administrative support and 
operations. Designate who and how deploying funds certification and funds disbursement 
capabilities will support deploying contracting capabilities.]  
 
b. (U)Contract/Fiscal Law Support. Specify who is responsible for providing 
contract law support to facilitate OCS. Also see Base Plan, Annex E Personnel, 
Appendix 4 Legal. [This sub-paragraph should describe specific contract and fiscal law 
support arrangements.]    
 
5.  (U) Command, Control and Contracting Authority 
 
a. (U) Command and Control. Address the OCS C2 organizational construct. 
[The GCC level plan or order must designate specific OCS C2 relationships and how 
they fit into the overall JFC C2 arrangements. The GCC level plan must specifically 
address any lead Service or JTSCC C2 relationships over attached subordinate 
contracting organizations and if planned, how the OCS C2 organizational construct may 
change or evolve.] 
 
b. (U) Contracting Authority. Address theater support head of contracting 
activity (HCA) authority to include linkages to in-theater contracting 
organization(s) and, if applicable, theater business clearance authorities. [This 
information should be addressed in the GCC level plan and be coordinated closely with 
the Service components and when necessary, DPAP. If determined necessary, coordinate 
with DPAP to initiate executive agent authority directives.] 
 
Annex W Appendixes and Associated Tabs: 
 
Appendix 1 Operational Contract Support Capabilities Summary. Identifies key 
contracting, separate CCAS organization (if applicable) and contract integration 
organizations by phase and location. [This appendix should capture the deployment 
sequence and primary location of key OCS related elements include such organizations. 
For example, GCC and/or sub-JFC Annex W should capture organizations such as the 
JCASO-MST, Army Contracting Support Brigades, USAF contingency Contracting unit 
HQs, etc. Service component Annex Ws should provide additional detail such as location 
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and support relationships of contingency contracting teams, LOGCAP support officers, 
etc.] 
 
Appendix 2 Contractor Management Plan (CMP). Identifies theater specific 
contractor management requirements to include key staff and subordinate 
command responsibilities. [The CMP should cover contractors authorized to 
Accompany the Force (CAAF) related deployment preparation, in-theater management 
(to include legal jurisdiction and discipline matters) and government furnished support 
coordination and support requirements. The CMP also must address certain contractor 
management requirements for non-CAAF contracted employees who have an area of 
performance on a U.S. military facility or within the vicinity of U.S. forces. It also can be 
used (when applicable) to address unique contractor management aspects of both CAAF 
and non-CAAF private security personnel. This CMP planning information must be 
closely coordinated with the applicable primary and special staff members. More details 
can be found in TAB H to APPENDIX F to ENCLOSURE F. 
 
Appendix 3 Summary of Contractor Support Estimate. Identifies the estimated 
contracted support requirements by function, location, phase of operation and 
includes estimated contractors accompanying the force footprint. [This tab provides 
data base like presentation of major contracted function guidance found in paragraph 3 
c. This information is depicted by JCA, phase of the operation, and location to include 
estimated CAAF footprint information. The CAAF personnel numbers estimates will be 
determined using historical data and/or the Contractor Estimate Tool. In the future, these 
estimates will be tied to standard and non-standard contracted unit type code 
information.] 
 
John A. Doe 







Jane E. Smith 
Major General (or applicable rank), U.S. xxxxx 




B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What were the billets, and how did they incorporate OCS?
a. Responsibilities?
b. How did the billets fit into the chain of command?
c. What commands were subordinate to the unit and how were they served?
d. What was the mission of the command in theater?
2. How did the command conduct OCS?
a. What role did the billet have within the OCS chain?
b. Did this billet have interaction with joint contracting commands, or did it
strictly interact with Marine Commands? 
c. How much interaction did the billet interact with customers?
d. Did the billet have a role in the requirements generation/validation process?
e. Did the billet have a role with post award contract management?
3. What was the dollar amount of the contracts the billet was responsible for?
a. How many service contracts/ supply contracts?
b. How many contractors were sourced through these contracts?
c. Were there different challenges with services contracts vs. supply contracts?
4. What were the specific trends in contracts that were completed on time, within scope,
and on budget executed? 
a. How was OCS performed on these contracts?
b. What planning was done to integrate OCS into the overall strategic plan?
c. Were requirements properly defined and validated?
d. How did the command manage contractors in theater?
5. What were the trends among the contracts that were not completed on time, within
scope, and on budget? 
a. How was OCS performed on these contracts?
b. What planning was done to integrate OCS into the overall strategic plan?
c. In general where did the problems stem from?
i. Requirements generation?
ii. Vendor selection?
iii. Post award contract management?
iv. Management of contractors in theater?
6. Is there a specific contract that was not completed on time, within scope, or within
budget as a direct result of a lack of proper OCS planning? 
a. What was the requirement, and who was the customer?
b. Describe what went wrong in the planning process.
c. Describe what went wrong in the execution process.
d. What element of OCS (Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support,
Contractor Management) did the contract fail and/or succeed in? 
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e. What was the fallout (i.e., tactical, operational, or strategic effects) from this 
contract being poorly executed?  
 
7. What requirements are generators required to know about the OCS process but did not 
know?  
 
8. What did senior leadership not know about OCS? 
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